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The Effect of Different Incentive Approaches on
Student Compliance and Performance When Using a Standardized Test
Kathleen A. Krentler and Patricia N. Dintrone
San Diego State University
 Interest
in assessment seems to have sparked a proliferation of learning outcomes
assessment tools however the task of tool administration has remained largely a
solitary one. How best to accomplish assessment administration in a way that
garners active participation, if not enthusiasm, from students?
Three incentive systems, all of which involved
“extra credit” were tested for their effect on student compliance with and
performance on a standardized test designed to assess mastery of essential
business principles that was administered in a capstone course. The three
different approaches were:
- Same number of extra credit points awarded
for participation (completion of test) to all students regardless of
individual performance.
- A larger number of extra credit points
awarded to students who performed in the top 10% of the class on the test; a
smaller number of extra credit points awarded to students in the middle 80%
of class performance; an even smaller number of extra credit points awarded
to students who took the test but performed in the bottom 10% and to
students who chose not to take the test.
- A specified number of extra credit points to
students who took the test and achieved a specified (70%) level of
performance.
Approach #2 produced a slightly lower
participation level (89.3%) than the other two approaches (92.7% and 94.1%
respectively) but the difference was not statistically significant. This is
particularly interesting when it is noted that students under this approach
received some extra credit points even if they chose not to take the exam.
Moreover, participation levels with all three approaches were high. It appears
that offering any type of incentive system does produce relatively high levels
of compliance. Since there was no control group used however (a section where no
incentive was offered), this result should be viewed with caution. An
alternative explanation is that a request from a faculty member to take the
test, even when it is not part of the evaluative components for a course, is
likely to be responded to favorably. The fact that Approach #2 produced an 89.3%
participation level even though students could earn extra credit points without
even taking the exam seems to support this alternative explanation.
Approach #3 produced a significantly higher level
of performance (53.4%) amongst the test takers than either of the other
approaches (50.5% and 50.8% respectively). This seems to suggest that students
are motivated to exert performance effort under this approach. Approach #2, the
competitive incentive system, however, also provided additional incentive for
higher performance and yet did not yield a statistically significant higher
level of performance than Approach #1 which provided no performance incentive.
It may be that student’s perceptions of the likelihood of scoring in the top ten
percent of the class (required for the larger amount of extra credit under
Approach #2) suggested that it was “not worth the effort.”
A copy of the complete study summarized here can
be obtained by e-mailing:
Kathleen.Krentler@sdsu.edu.
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